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Abstract:  This paper considers possible public policies that could improve efficiency and 
welfare distribution in the U.S. retail payments industry.  Mainly, four options,  i) 
encouraging competition; ii) allowing merchants to surcharge; iii) regulating merchant 
fees; and iv) regulating payment card rewards, are discussed, but each option has 
advantages and disadvantages. Any single option may not achieve the policymakers’ 
objective; rather, combining several policy options may be required.  
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City. E-mail:fumiko.hayashi@kc.frb.org.  The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do 
not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City or the Federal Reserve System. 1.  Introduction 
In many countries, public authorities have intervened with the payment card industry in 
general and the payment card fee structure in particular.
2 Some public policy interventions have 
directly regulated the level of the fees paid by merchants and other interventions have abolished 
network rules and/or encouraged competition among card networks, aiming to reduce the level of 
fees paid by merchants. In the United States, public authorities and legislatures have not taken 
actions regarding the payment card fee structure until very recently. In 2008, the U.S. legislature 
has introduced two bills in the Congress, which are aiming to change the balance between the 
merchant fee and the cardholder fee (or rewards).   
Policymakers should consider three key questions, when considering public policies.  
First, what is the optimal balance between the merchant fee and cardholder fee (or payment card 
rewards)? Second, if the market cannot reach the optimal balance, what market forces cause the 
equilibrium fee structure to deviate from the optimal fee structure? And third, what are policy 
options?  This paper is the last of a series of three papers. The first paper examined the optimal 
balance between the merchant fee and the cardholder fee from both efficiency and equity 
perspectives.
3 The results and available empirical evidence suggest that providing rewards may 
not be the most efficient; nevertheless, the rewards are prevalent in the United States. The second 
paper investigated what market forces drive payment card rewards.
4 The results suggest that 
there are three potential market forces that altogether may drive payment card rewards, and that 
encouraging competition among card networks—the policy commonly used in a typical one-
sided market—may not work to improve efficiency and/or welfare distribution; rather, the policy 
                                                 
2 Bradford and Hayashi (2008). 
3 Hayashi (2008a). 
4 Hayashi (2008b). 
  2may potentially deteriorate those.  These results should be utilized to consider the public 
policies—knowing these results may reduce the risk of implementing policies that may bring 
unwanted outcomes for policymakers. This paper considers potential public policies that could 
improve efficiency and welfare distributions in the U.S. retail payment industry.    
There are several viable options that would change the current balance between the 
merchant fee and the cardholder fee to a more desirable balance from both efficiency and equity 
points of view. More specifically, reducing the merchant fee and payment card rewards would 
likely enhance social welfare and improve its distribution.  This paper discusses some of those 
options and addresses advantages and disadvantages of each option. Any single option might not 
be able to achieve the policy goal; instead, combining several options may be required.  In some 
instances, theory and available empirical evidence give a clear policy implication. In other 
instances, insufficient theory or a lack of evidence makes it hard to evaluate some policy options.  
In these cases, this paper points to the theory and data that would be required. How to design 
more suitable (combinations of) policies is very challenging, yet it may not be infeasible.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 recaps the results in the first and 
the second papers—the optimal balance between the merchant fee and the cardholder fee, and 
equilibrium fee structures and their welfare consequences. Section 3 considers policy options and 
their advantages and disadvantages. Section 4 concludes.  
2.  Recap—Optimal Fee Structures and Equilibrium Fee Structures 
2.1 Recap—Optimal Fee Structure 
Efficiency and equity are two commonly used criteria to consider the “optimal” fee 
structures or price levels. Efficiency is often measured by social welfare, which consists of 
welfares of all parties involved in the market.  The most efficient card fee structure, therefore, 
  3can be defined as the fee structure that maximizes social welfare of all parties involved in the 
payment card market. Equity considers the distribution of social welfare among different parties. 
In contrast to efficiency, there is no clear way to measure equity.  Because equity and efficiency 
do not necessarily coincide, political decision is required to define the “optimal” fee structure. 
Therefore, one approach to consider the “optimal” fee structure is to examine the most efficient 
card fee structure and its effects on welfare distribution among different parties.  
Although it is not always the case, in most cases the most efficient cardholder fee is the 
difference between the card network’s costs for a card transaction and the merchant transactional 
benefit from the card transaction. Therefore, in most cases, providing rewards to card-using 
consumers is the most efficient only when the merchant transactional benefit from a card 
transaction exceeds the card network’s costs of processing it. In some cases, the product price 
and the merchant fee also affect social welfare, while in other cases, they do not.   
The most efficient fee structure and product price do not necessarily make all parties 
involved in the payment card market better off, compared with the economy where no card 
products are available.  Especially, consumers who use the alternative payment method, such as 
cash and checks, would likely be worse off, if the product price they face is higher due to the 
introduction of the cards.  Since the product price is generally positively correlated with the 
merchant fee, the higher the merchant fee, the worse off these consumers are. Furthermore, not 
all card-using consumers are better off even when the fee structure and product price are the 
most efficient.  Card-using consumers whose transactional benefit from cards is relatively small 
would likely be worse off due to the higher product price. In contrast, card-using consumers 
whose transactional benefit from cards is relatively high would likely be better off because their 
  4transactional benefit from cards would likely exceed the welfare losses due to the higher product 
price.   
If merchants are allowed to set different prices according to their customers’ payment 
method and if they actually practice such pricing, then the maximum social welfare would not be 
lower than that when merchants are not allowed to do so. In some cases, the merchant’s ability to 
price discriminate their customers would increase the maximum social welfare, while in other 
cases, it would not affect the maximum social welfare.  In either case, the merchant’s practicing 
discriminatory pricing would likely affect welfare distribution. The most efficient card fee 
structure and product price would be less likely to negatively affect the surplus of a consumer 
who uses the alternative payment method.  And all card-using consumers would likely be better 
off compared with the case where no card products are available. Because of the incentive 
compatibility constraints, the merchants and card networks would not incur losses under the most 
efficient fee structure and product price regardless of whether the merchants set different prices 
across payment methods or not.      
Whether the most efficient cardholder fee is positive or negative is an empirical question. 
Available existing cost studies, which used relatively old information on merchant costs, suggest 
that the most efficient cardholder fee may likely be positive.
5  This implies providing rewards 
may not be the most efficient. In order for policymakers to accurately evaluate whether currently 
provided payment card rewards are efficient or not, collecting comprehensive and updated 
information on costs and benefits of various parties is required.       
2.2 Recap—Equilibrium Fee Structure 
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  5The second paper investigated what market forces drive payment card rewards, when 
providing rewards may not be the most efficient. The paper identified three factors that 
altogether may explain the prevalence of rewards programs in the United State today.  They are 
oligopolistic merchants, output-maximizing card networks, and the merchant’s inability to set 
different prices across payment methods. It is quite plausible that these three factors co-exist in 
the U.S. payment card market.  
Arguably, some merchants may be monopolistic at least locally.  Having rewards at 
equilibrium with monopolistic merchants is possible but in rather limited circumstances. When 
consumers make a fixed number of transactions (say, all consumers make an X number of 
transactions a year), providing rewards is unlikely to be at equilibrium. In this case, monopolistic 
merchants would not accept cards if the merchant fee exceeds their transactional benefit, and 
thus card networks cannot provide rewards without incurring losses. When a consumer’s demand 
function for goods is downward-sloping, which implies the number of transactions the consumer 
makes increases as the product price decreases (or the cardholder fee decreases in the case of 
card users), the equilibrium cardholder fee may potentially be negative. In this case, 
monopolistic merchants would accept the cards even when the merchant fee exceeds their 
transactional benefit because accepting the cards may induce a consumer demand curve shift 
upwards. In contrast, oligopolistic merchants are more likely to accept cards even when the 
merchant fee exceeds their transactional benefit, because of their strategic motives. The higher 
merchant fee allows the card networks to provide rewards without incurring losses.   
It may be quite intuitive that output-maximizing networks are more likely to provide 
rewards than profit-maximizing networks, aiming for more consumers to use the cards instead of 
using the alternative payment method. When merchants are oligopolistic, a profit-maximizing 
  6monopoly network would set the most efficient cardholder fees, and thus, it would not provide 
rewards when providing rewards is not the most efficient. The idea is that the profit-maximizing 
monopoly network uses the cardholder fee to increase social welfare as much as possible and 
uses the merchant fee to absorb the welfare gains as much as possible. This implies that the 
cardholder fee set by an output-maximizing network is likely lower than the most efficient 
cardholder fee. We should note that the fee structure set by the profit-maximizing monopoly 
network is not generally the most efficient; although the cardholder fee coincides with the most 
efficient one, the merchant fee is generally higher than the most efficient merchant fee.  
When merchants set different prices for card-using consumers and for consumers who use 
the alternative payment method, if per transaction costs and fees are fixed, then the fee structure 
does not affect the number of card transactions; rather, the sum of the cardholder fee and 
merchant fee affects the number of card transactions.
6 In this case, although the card networks 
may provide rewards, the effect of rewards would be offset by the difference in the product 
prices for card-using and for non-card-using consumers. Thus, the card networks would not have 
an incentive to provide rewards. If per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the 
transaction value, then even when merchants set different prices, the card fee structure still 
affects the number of card transactions. Nevertheless, the merchants’ ability to set different 
prices induces the card networks to set their merchant fees as low as possible. Both profit-
maximizing and output-maximizing card networks may even set negative merchant fees.  This 
implies that the card networks would not provide rewards at equilibrium.         
The results of the theoretical models also suggest that whether per transaction costs and 
fees are fixed or proportional to the transaction value would significantly influence the 
equilibrium fee structure, especially when card networks are competing. When per transaction 
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  7costs and fees are fixed (as many theoretical models assume), the equilibrium cardholder fees 
would converge to the most efficient cardholder fee as more cardholding consumers become 
multihoming.  A multihoming cardholder is indifferent among cards: if the merchant accepts all 
(branded) cards, then his choice of which card to use is solely dependent on the cardholder fees 
of the cards—he chooses the card with the lowest (highest) cardholder fee (level of rewards).  In 
contrast, when per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, even if all 
cardholders are multihoming, the equilibrium cardholder fee set by competing card networks 
would unlikely be the most efficient; rather it would be less efficient than the cardholder fee set 
by a monopoly network.  This implies that competition among card networks potentially 
deteriorates social welfare.  In fact, the results suggest that when per transaction costs and fees 
are proportional to the transaction value, the equilibrium social welfare would not just be lower 
than the maximum social welfare, but would also potentially be lower than the social welfare 
without cards at all. Consumers as a whole and merchants would be worse off, compared with 
the economy without cards.  This may warrant public policy interventions.   
3.  Policy Considerations 
This section considers possible public policies that could improve efficiency and welfare 
distribution in the U.S. retail payments industry.  This section mainly discusses four options: i) 
encouraging competition; ii) allowing merchants to surcharge; iii) regulating merchant fees; and 
iv) regulating payment card rewards. However, this does not necessarily imply these options are 
better than any other options. In fact, each option has advantages and disadvantages. And any 
single option may not be able to achieve the policymakers’ goal. Instead, combining several 
options may be required.   
Encouraging card network competition alone may not be a good option      
  8To achieve the efficient allocation, encouraging competition is a commonly used policy 
option in a typical one-sided market. However, how encouraging competition in a two-sided 
market affects efficiency has not been fully understood.  Because of the two-sidedness, 
encouraging competition in one or both sides—the consumer side and merchant side—of the 
market may significantly affect efficiency. As credit card networks claim, they may already be 
quite competitive in the consumer side of the market. Card issuers (including the three-party 
scheme card networks) compete for card users by providing generous rewards to entice them to 
use the issuers’ cards. The four-party scheme networks set higher interchange fees to entice card 
issuers to issue cards of their brands. As more issuers provide more generous rewards and 
differentiate their card products to compete for cardholders, more cardholders may become 
singlehoming, meaning they strongly prefer to use one card as much as possible.  This 
cardholder’s behavior allows for card networks to set a monopolistic merchant fee, even though 
they are competing in the consumer side of the market.
7 Therefore, encouraging competition in 
the merchant side of the market may be required to reduce the levels of merchant fees and 
rewards toward more efficient levels. 
Several options are proposed to enhance card networks’ competition in the merchant side 
of the market. Abolishing network rules, such as honor-all-cards rule
8 and single entity rule
9, 
and mandating a single card to carry multiple card networks may allow merchants to influence 
their customers’ payment choice toward less expensive payment methods for the merchants. 
However, how influential merchants can be is a question. Merchants may be reluctant to reject 
any issuers’ cards if some of their customers strongly prefer those cards to use. As long as 
                                                 
7 See Guthrie and Wright (2007) and Hayashi (2008b).  
8 A merchant that accepts a network’s credit (or debit) card must accept all of the network’s credit (or debit) cards 
regardless of the card issuer or specific card programs, such as consumer credit vs. corporate credit cards or no-
reward consumer credit vs. reward consumer credit cards.  
9 A merchant that accepts a network’s card is required to accept it at every retail location.  
  9consumers have a strong preference for which card network to process the transaction, merchants 
may have little influence even if the card carries multiple card networks.
10  
Merchants can be the most influential for their customers’ payment choice when all 
cardholders are multihoming.  As mentioned before, multihoming cardholders hold multiple 
cards and are indifferent among cards: their choice of which payment card to use solely depends 
on the cardholder fees as long as the merchant accepts all cards they hold.  Even if all 
cardholders are multihoming, the equilibrium fee structure may not be the most efficient. As 
shown in the second paper (Hayashi 2008b), whether the equilibrium fee structure is the most 
efficient or not depends on the nature of per transaction costs and fees of the payment methods. 
When per transaction costs and fees are fixed amounts regardless of the transaction value, then as 
more cardholders become multihoming, the equilibrium fee structure converges to the most 
efficient fee structure.  In contrast, when per transaction costs and fees are proportional to the 
transaction value, then even when all cardholders are multihoming, the equilibrium fee structure 
may not be efficient. In fact, the equilibrium fee structure in this case is less efficient than in the 
case where all cardholders are singlehoming. Thus, encouraging card networks’ competition in 
the merchant side of the market may potentially deteriorate social welfare.  
Because the current payment card fees are generally proportional to the transaction value, 
policymakers should be careful about this policy option.  One thing policymakers can do before 
giving up this policy option is to investigate whether payment card fees need to be proportional 
to the transaction value or not.  If the card networks’ costs of a card transaction, the merchants’ 
transaction costs and fees for the alternative payment methods, and consumers’ transactional 
                                                 
10 Currently, a typical debit card in the United States carries both PIN- and signature-based debits. Some consumers 
strongly prefer signature debit while other consumers prefer PIN debit or are indifferent between the two. Merchants 
generally prefer PIN-debits due to their lower fees. There are mixed views about how influential merchants are 
when consumers choose between PIN- and signature-debit. Some merchants may have been successful in steering 
their customers toward PIN-debit, however other merchants may not.  
  10benefit from cards are not proportional to the transaction value, then encouraging the card 
networks’ competition in the merchant side of the market, combined with making payment card 
fees fixed, may be a viable policy option. If these costs, fees and benefits are actually 
proportional to the transaction value, then encouraging the card networks’ competition alone 
may not be a good policy option.       
 Abolishing no-surcharge rule may not be enough 
Many card networks have a rule that restricts merchants to set different prices based on 
their customers’ payment methods (the so-called no-surcharge rule or no-discriminatory rule). In 
several countries, regulatory interventions abolished this rule and merchants are now allowed to 
price discriminate their customers based on their payment methods. Those countries include 
Australia, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.   
Theoretically, merchants’ practicing discriminatory pricing is welfare enhancing unless 
either card networks or merchants are monopolistic. When per transaction costs and fees are 
fixed, the merchants’ setting of different prices across payment methods changes the payment 
card market from two-sided to one-sided.  That is, the fee structure does not affect the number of 
card transactions any more; rather, the sum of the two fees, the merchant fee and the cardholder 
fee, affects the number of card transactions.  In a one-sided market, conventional competition 
policies—encouraging competition among card networks—may improve efficiency.  When per 
transaction costs and fees are proportional to the transaction value, the fee structure still affects 
the equilibrium card transaction volume even if merchants set different prices across payment 
methods. Nevertheless, the equilibrium fee structure would likely become more efficient if 
neither card networks nor merchants are monopolistic. Therefore, allowing merchants to price 
  11discriminate their customers would potentially improve social welfare if it is used with 
competition policies.   
However, whether merchants actually practice such pricing is a question. Although the 
threat of setting different prices could induce card networks to lower the merchant fees, if 
practicing such pricing cannot be wide spread among merchants for various reasons, then this 
policy would not be very effective. Empirical evidence from other countries, such as Netherlands 
and Sweden,
11 suggests that although merchants are allowed to set different prices to their 
customers, many of them do not do so.
12  According to the Reserve Bank of Australia, practicing 
surcharging card customers is becoming more common among merchants, but larger merchants 
are more likely to practice surcharging than their smaller counterparts.
13 Experience in these 
countries may imply that setting different prices across payment methods is costly for merchants. 
There may be another reason why such pricing is difficult for merchants, especially in the 
United States, even if they were allowed to do so.  To effectively set different prices, merchants 
need to know the exact level of merchant fees as well as cardholder fees.  However, in reality, 
the U.S. merchants typically do not know their own fee level of a particular transaction due to 
the complex interchange/merchant fee structures.  Furthermore, merchants do not know their 
customers’ cardholder fees. Even the “average” cardholder fees in the industry as a whole are 
difficult to obtain.   
Thus, if policymakers would want merchants to set different prices based on the payment 
methods, other policies that eliminate the obstacles to doing so may also be needed.  For 
example, simplifying the card networks’ fees would make it easier for the merchants to 
determine the price levels for card-using consumes and non-card-using consumers.   
                                                 
11 Today, surcharging is not allowed in Sweden.  
12 See IMA Market Development AB (2000) and ITM Research (2002).   
13 See Graph 2 in Reserve Bank of Australia (2008).  
  12Again, policymakers should be careful about the option of combining two policies—
allowing merchants to price discriminate customers and encouraging competition among card 
networks and merchants.  If either one of the two policies is not effective, the equilibrium 
outcome after the policy intervention would likely be worse than that before the intervention. As 
discussed above, if merchants are reluctant to set different prices based on the payment methods, 
encouraging competition among card networks may potentially lower social welfare.  If either 
the merchants set a monopolistic product price or the card networks set a monopolistic merchant 
fee, then the merchants’ practicing discriminatory pricing may potentially lower social welfare.     
Regulating the merchant fees, rather than the interchange fees, may be more reasonable but it 
would require measuring costs and benefits of a card transaction accurately  
Direct regulations on interchange fees and/or merchant fees have been taken in many 
countries.
14 The regulatory authorities determine the regulated level or cap of interchange fees or 
merchant fees.  In some of these countries, public authorities regulate interchange fees of four-
party scheme networks and do not regulate merchant fees of three-party scheme networks. The 
same policy—regulating four-party scheme interchange fees only—may not work well in the 
United States for two reasons. First, three-party scheme networks, such as American Express and 
Discover, have relatively large market shares in the United States; and although these three-party 
scheme networks do not have explicit interchange fees, their organizational form is now close to 
the four-party scheme: their cards are now issued by financial institutions (such as Citibank and 
Bank of America), and their merchant acquiring services are also provided by third-parties (such 
as Fifth Third Bank), besides the card networks themselves. Therefore, regulating the four-party 
scheme interchange fees gives a competitive advantage to the three-party scheme networks, and 
                                                 
14 See Bradford and Hayashi (2008).  
  13card issuing financial institutions would likely switch their card brands from the four-party to the 
three-party schemes.   Second, regulating interchange fees alone allows card networks to find the 
other ways to transfer funds from merchants to card issuers. For instance, card networks may 
lower association dues for card issuing members and raise them for acquiring members, which 
are ultimately paid by merchants. Because the policymakers’ ultimate goal is to set the 
appropriate balance between the fees paid by merchants and the fees paid (or rewards received) 
by consumers, this policy would require policymakers to monitor other fees as well.    
Some regulators require interchange fees or merchant fees to be set based on the cost-based 
benchmarks. If the U.S. policymakers would regulate the merchant fees based on the cost-based 
benchmark, they need to determine which costs should be included in the cost-based 
benchmarks. Typically, the merchants and the card networks (and their card issuers) have 
different views on which costs should be covered by the fees paid by merchants.  Although the 
cost categories that are allowed to be included in the cost-based benchmark vary by country and 
payment card type (credit or debit), there are mainly three cost categories considered that issuers 
can recover from the fees paid by merchants: One is the costs of processing a transaction, which 
includes both authorization and clearing/settlement processes. Two is the costs for fraud losses 
(including payment guarantee to the merchants) and fraud prevention.  And three is the costs of 
free-funding period.  
We should note that providing rewards is not considered as the cost of issuers in the 
countries that regulate the interchange fees or merchant fees. To some extent, this view is shared 
with the theoretical literature on the payment card industry. In the theoretical models, providing 
rewards is not included in the card network’s costs or the joint costs of the acquirer and the issuer 
for a card transaction; rather, rewards are considered as negative cardholder fees. However, this 
  14does not necessarily justify regulating the interchange fees or merchant fees based on the cost-
based benchmark.  
Setting the level (or cap) of the merchant fees at the cost-based benchmarks would be 
welfare enhancing if the most efficient cardholder fee—the card network’s costs (or the joint 
costs of the acquirer, the issuer and the card network) for a card transaction minus the merchant’s 
transactional benefit from a card transaction—is positive but the market equilibrium cardholder 
fee is negative (i.e., rewards are provided). The resulting cardholder fees due to this regulation 
are likely to be still lower than the most efficient cardholder fee, but they are likely to be closer 
to the most efficient cardholder fee than the pre-regulation equilibrium cardholder fees.  
In contrast, if the most efficient cardholder fee is negative (i.e., providing rewards at a 
certain level is the most efficient), the same policy may either improve or worsen social 
welfare.
15  The resulted cardholder fees due to the regulation are likely to be higher than the 
most efficient cardholder fee, while the market equilibrium cardholder fees are likely to be lower 
than the most efficient cardholder fee. Thus, whether the regulation improves or worsens social 
welfare depends on the difference between the cardholder fees under the regulation and the most 
efficient cardholder fee and the difference between the equilibrium cardholder fees and the most 
efficient cardholder fee. If the former is greater than the latter (i.e., the resulted cardholder fees 
are much higher than the most efficient cardholder fee), then the cost-based merchant fee would 
likely worsen social welfare.  On the other hand, if the latter is greater than the former (i.e., the 
current rewards at the market are too generous compared with the most efficient rewards level), 
then the regulated merchant fee would likely improve social welfare.     
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likely positive.   
  15The potential negative effects of this policy option on social welfare would be diminished 
if policymakers use this option with policies that encourage competition among card networks 
and among merchants. Except for some special cases (when per transaction costs and fees for the 
payment methods are fixed and consumers make a fixed number of transactions regardless of the 
price of the goods), the product prices affect social welfare, and generally, social welfare 
increases as the product prices are lowered. Thus, encouraging competition among merchants to 
reduce the product prices would positively affect social welfare. And encouraging competition 
among card networks (especially when card networks are profit-maximizing) would reduce the 
risk that the resulted cardholder fees due to the regulation become too high compared with the 
most efficient cardholder fee. 
Nevertheless, setting the merchant fees based on the cost-based benchmarks may still 
negatively impact social welfare, and therefore, policymakers should be careful about this policy 
option.  It would be safer for policymakers to implement this policy option if it is certain that the 
most efficient cardholder fee is positive or it is negative but close enough to zero.  
Another downside of this policy option is that it requires accurately measuring the joint 
costs of the acquirer, the issuer, and the card network for a card transaction (if three-party 
scheme, then simply the card network’s costs) and it also requires policymakers to determine 
which level of the costs should be used to set the merchant fees.  According to several industry 
studies, the issuer’s costs vary by issuer: larger card issuers tend to have lower costs than their 
smaller counterparts.
16 Policymakers need to decide whether the highest, the average, or the 
lowest costs among issuers should be used to determine the level (or the cap) of the merchant 
fees. If policymakers choose the cost level that is lower than the highest, then the highest cost 
                                                 
16 According to various industry sources. For instance, Star Network’s POS Debit Issuer Cost Studies (2006, 2007) 
and Visa’s Credit Card Issuer Functional Cost studies.  
 
  16issuers may need to exit the market. But if policymakers choose the highest costs, then some 
issuers, presumably larger issuers, might still be able to provide too generous rewards to their 
customers.  
Ideally, policymakers would want to set the merchant fees at the most appropriate level, 
instead of setting the merchant fees at the cost-based benchmarks.  However, depending on the 
market environment, such as competition among card networks and their objective and 
competition among merchants, the regulated merchant fees would not necessarily result in the 
appropriate levels of cardholder fees and product prices.  If card networks are output-maximizing 
and merchants are quite competitive, then setting the merchant fees at the merchant’s 
transactional benefit from a card would make the cardholder fees and the product prices close to 
the most efficient levels. Therefore, setting the merchant fees at the most appropriate level is 
more effective if it is used with policies encouraging competition among card networks and 
among merchants.   
Setting the merchant fees at the merchant transactional benefit from cards does not require 
accurately measuring the joint costs of the acquirer, the issuer, and the card network; however, it 
requires accurately measuring the merchant’s transactional benefit from a card, which may be 
more challenging. Merchants may have an incentive to underreport their transactional benefit 
from a card in order to reduce the merchant fee. Therefore, policymakers need to obtain the 
merchants’ transactional benefit from the other sources (for example, comprehensive studies on 
merchant’s costs and benefits that can also be used to set fees for the alternative payment 
methods, such as cash and checks, or the merchant tax information that reflects the costs of 
alternative payment method).      
  17Although regulating the merchant fees may not be infeasible and may potentially improve 
social welfare, this option requires policymakers to accurately measure the card network’s costs 
or the merchant’s transactional benefit from cards.  Policymakers may need to periodically revise 
this information on costs/benefits. The administration costs of this policy option might not be 
negligible.   
 Regulating the rewards with abolishing no-surcharge rule and encouraging competition 
may work  
As an alternative to directly regulating the merchant fees, policymakers have an option of 
directly regulating payment card rewards. They could cap the reward level at either zero or the 
difference between the merchant transactional benefit from cards and the card network’s cost for 
a card transaction (whichever is higher).  This would improve social welfare when the 
equilibrium payment card rewards are much more generous than the most efficient level. An 
advantage of this option is that the rewards level is always at or closer to the most efficient level, 
regardless of the market environment, such as the card networks’ competition and the merchants’ 
competition. However, a downside is that policymakers need to know both the card network’s 
costs (or the joint costs of the acquirer, the issuer, and the card network) and the merchant’s 
transactional benefit from a card.  As discussed earlier, accurately measuring the card network’s 
costs and the merchant’s transactional benefit is very challenging.   
Another way to regulate the payment card rewards is setting the rewards level at zero. This 
does not require policymakers to measure either the card network’s costs or the merchant’s 
transactional benefits. Obviously, this option alone may negatively impact social welfare if 
providing rewards is the most efficient.  However, if this option is used with competition policies 
and abolishing no-surcharge rules, then social welfare would likely be improved. Consider the 
  18case where the most efficient cardholder fee is negative (i.e., providing rewards is the most 
efficient). Competitive card networks may want to maximize their output, the number of card 
transactions, but they now need to do so by reducing the merchant fees. The lowest merchant fee 
they can set is at their cost of a card transaction (otherwise they make losses). Since the most 
efficient cardholder fee is negative, this implies that the merchant transactional benefit from a 
card is greater than the card network’s costs of a card transaction. The merchants would save 
more if their customers use the cards instead of using the alternative payment methods. Thus, if 
they are allowed to price discriminate their customers, they would set a lower product price for 
card-using customers and a higher product price for customers who use the alternative payment 
methods, such as cash and checks. The card networks may want to encourage the merchants to 
set different prices for card-using consumers and non-card-using consumers: they may simplify 
their fee schedule so that the merchants can easily determine the product prices by payment 
method. In order for product prices to effectively reflect the merchant’s benefit from a card, 
merchants need to be quite competitive.  Thus, policymakers need to encourage competition 
among merchants.   
If, on the other hand, the most efficient cardholder fee is positive, setting payment card 
rewards level at zero alone would improve social welfare, although it would not be the most 
efficient.  Combining the other two policies—abolishing no-surcharge rule and encouraging 
competition among card networks and among merchants—to this option would be unlikely to 
harm social welfare.   
A downside of this option may be the unattractiveness of the option for some card-using 
consumers: This option would be welfare reducing for those consumers whose transactional 
benefit from cards is relatively high, although the option would be welfare enhancing for 
  19consumers as a whole. Even for consumers who would benefit from this policy, it may be 
difficult to recognize their welfare gains, because they usually do not observe how much product 
prices are raised and thus how much their welfare is reduced due to higher merchant fees.  
Another downside of regulating the payment card rewards level at zero may be its 
enforcement. Although they may not be as effective as the current generous rewards programs, 
card issuers may find other ways to reward their customers. For example, extending the warranty 
of the products purchased with their cards or waiving annual fees of the credit cards or fees of 
other products the card issuers offer. Thus, this option may potentially require policymakers to 
monitor card issuers’ behavior closely.   
4.  Conclusion 
This paper considered the policy options that are available to the U.S. policymakers.  Four 
main options—encouraging competition among card networks and among merchants, abolishing 
no-surcharge rule, regulating the merchant fees, and regulating the payment card rewards—were 
discussed. Since each option has advantages and disadvantages, any single option may not 
achieve the policymakers’ objective—to improve efficiency and welfare distribution among 
parties involved in the retail payment system. Rather, combining several policy options may 
potentially work.   
Because of the complexity of the payment card markets, the potential effects of any policy 
interventions may vary by market environments, such as competition among card networks and 
their objectives, competition among merchants, consumer’s demand for goods, and so on.  
Although the paper tried to consider many different plausible market environments, it may still 
overlook some key market characteristics that may significantly change the effects of policy 
  20interventions. Further theoretical developments as well as comprehensive data gathering may be 
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